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1. Summary  
As one scholar says, there is little doubt that international human rights treaties help some 
people some of the time (Hafner-Burton, 2009). The larger question is whether the level of gains 
that can be found empirically are sufficient to merit continued effort, which is a value judgement.  
Are international human rights treaties associated with better rights performance?  
• The appetite for a conclusive answer has driven a number of large scale quantitative 
studies that have broadly shown little or no effect, and sometimes even a 
backsliding. However, the headline conclusions belie much more complicated findings, 
and the research methods used are controversial. These issues undermine confidence 
in the findings.   
• Comparative and individual case studies allow for more detailed information about how 
domestic human rights activists use international human rights laws in practice. 
They tend to be more positive about the effect of treaties, but they are not as 
systematic as the quantitative work.  
• Some indirect measures of treaty effect show that the norms contained within them filter 
down into domestic constitutions, and that the process of human rights reporting at the 
UN may be useful if dialogue can be considered an a priori good.   
What drives states to comply with international human rights treaties?  
It is likely that states are driven to comply with human rights obligations through a combination of 
dynamic influences. Drivers of compliance with international law is a major, unresolved question 
in the research that is heavily influenced by the worldview of researchers.  
The two strongest findings are: 
• Domestic context drives compliance. In particular: (1) The strength of domestic non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and links with international NGOs (INGOs), and (2) 
in partial and transitioning democracies where locals have a reason to use the treaties as 
tools to press their claims. 
• External enforcement may help drive compliance when: (1) other states link human 
rights obligations in the treaties to preferential trade agreements, and (2) INGOs ‘name 
and shame’ human rights violations, possibly reducing inward investment flows from 
companies worried about their reputation.  
Scholars also identify intermediate effects of continued dialogue and norm socialisation from the 
UN’s human rights reporting processes. Interviews with diplomats involved in UN reporting say 
that the process is more effective when NGOs and individual governments are involved.  
Evidence base: All of the evidence found came from academic research. As a major 
foundational question in the field of international law and international relations, there is a very 
large literature on the topic precisely because there are so many different ways to answer it. 
Within the limits of a rapid review, an attempt was made to cover the most cited articles which 
are emblematic of the different research approaches. Because results are so sensitive to the 
methods used, there is some attention to methodology, but space constraints do not allow full 
explanations. The evidence found did not address gender or disability issues. 
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2. What rights do international human rights treaties 
cover? 
The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recognises nine core 
international human rights treaties (OHCHR, undated). Together they cover over 300 rights, 
including economic rights such as the right to work, pensions and housing (see Posner, 2014, 
p.151 for a full list of the rights covered in each treaty).  They also cover many of the civil and 
political rights associated with “open societies,” including: 
• The right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity. 
• Freedoms of expression, religion, association and peaceful assembly.  
• Fair trials and protection from torture. 
• The right to vote. 
All UN Member States have ratified at least one core international human rights treaty, and 80 
percent have ratified four or more (OHCHR, undated). Some of the rights appear repeatedly in 
several of the treaties. 
3. Do treaties lead to better human rights in practice?  
There are many difficulties to answering this seemingly 
straightforward question. 
• The absence of counterfactuals: One of the fundamental difficulties with determining 
whether international legal regimes affect state behaviour is being able to pose a 
convincing counterfactual…to demonstrate that a compliant state would have exhibited a 
lower level of compliance had it not ratified the treaty in question (Hill, 2010).  
• Human rights may conflict with each other: Posner (2014) notes that: laws that 
improve judicial procedure and give greater protections to defendants might cause police 
to use extra-judicial methods— torture, harassment, killings— to maintain order, so while 
human rights improvements will be seen in one area, the net effect may be nil or even 
negative. Similarly, a law that provides greater health services to women might result in 
fewer funds for schools.  
• Causal inference is unrealistic: Scholars of international human rights law still regularly 
debate whether the major international agreements have had any effect on state 
behaviour. Part of the reason that this threshold question is still contested is that there 
are a number of barriers to causal inference that make answering it with observational 
data incredibly difficult (Chilton, 2017).  
• Measures of human rights are controversial: There are measurement problems from 
scarce sources of uniform information and reliable data across the global set of states. 
Typically, scholars must choose between rather thin measures of human rights, usually 
limited to individual rights and freedoms, or richer qualitative measures that do not allow 
as much empirical rigour (Keith, 2010). 
• It may be the wrong question: In a review of the literature, Moyn (2018) contends that 
there is not much difference between scholars who argue for and against treaties with 
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their empirical results – both show some effects on human rights practices. He says that 
what would really settle the dispute is a theory of what counts as sufficient progress, and 
this is not something empiricism could ever provide.  
Several large-scale quantitative studies show that ratification does 
not improve human rights. 
In a first large-scale quantitative study, Keith (1999) tested whether ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) affected civil and political rights as 
measured by the Freedom House index in 178 countries. In a first bivariate test of differences of 
means, she found “statistically significant differences between the behavior of states parties and 
the behavior of non-party states” (p.95). However, in further different tests, she found no 
statistically significant influence of ICCPR ratification, and concludes that “it may be overly 
optimistic to expect that being a party to this international covenant will produce an observable 
direct impact” (p.95). 
Hathaway’s (2002) much cited work (2371 citations1) contains “more comprehensive methods” 
than Keith’s (Neumayer, 2005, p.933). To measure human rights practices, she takes scores on 
genocide from the U.S. State Failure Task Force Project and the civil liberty index from Freedom 
House. She also codes her own measures of torture and fair trial from U.S. state data. She 
measures women's political rights by the percentage of men in each country's legislature. She 
then tests their relationship with the adoption of several treaties: the Genocide Convention, the 
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, and a 
number of regional human rights treaties. 
Comparing the average human rights score of countries that have ratified the treaties with those 
that have not, she finds that ratifying countries typically have a better record than 
nonratifying ones. However, further, different tests find no evidence that ratification of 
international human rights treaties is systematically associated with better human rights 
performance. In some cases, she finds that ratification is associated with worse performance 
(Neumayer, 2005).  
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) quantify data from the U.S. state department and Amnesty 
International, to test the relationship to treaty adoption using a different statistical model to 
Hathaway. The authors conclude that: “there is no systematic evidence to suggest that 
ratification of human rights treaties in the UN system itself improves human rights 
practices.” However, the authors also state that: “the growing legitimacy of human rights ideas in 
international society, which the legal regime helped establish, provides much leverage for 




1 All citation counts in this rapid review are taken from Google Scholar. 
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The methods used in these quantitative studies are frequently 
criticised.   
The authors of these large-scale quantitative studies are careful to lay out their statistical models 
and data sources in all their complexity, as well as conflicting findings. However, later citations 
of these studies frequently present them simplistically as proof that human rights treaties 
do not affect human rights practices. 
Simmons (2010) criticises these studies for methodological weaknesses (p.289). On Hathaway’s 
research, she makes three main criticisms: (1) on the assumption that the more treaties a 
country ratifies, the higher the expected commitment to human rights (2) it is suspect to treat 
ratification as an exogenous variable –“it can hardly be the case that states randomly sort into 
ratifiers and nonratifiers” (p.290), and (3) “the studies were designed only to detect homogenous 
effects across all states alike. Despite acknowledging a complex social and political world, the 
treaties are modelled as unmediated and their effects unconditional. Practically no one 
who has done qualitative work in this area imagines such a determinative or direct 
mechanism. Rather, they see treaties as tools for strategic or normatively driven actors to 
change the politics of human rights compliance in specific institutional contexts” (p.290).  
Neumayer (2005) also criticises the methods used by Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), and 
Keith (1999). Hill (2010, p.1162) further criticises elements of the statistical models used in such 
research. Keith (2010, p.15/26 pdf) states “weak confidence” in the literature that fails to find an 
association of better human rights with treaty commitment due to their neglect of methods to 
“operationalize and test the underlying assumptions that would predict no effect.”  
Some research highlights gains in human rights practices related 
to human rights laws. 
Using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods, another highly cited work by Simmons (2009, 
2304 citations) shows that treaties have made an important positive difference in terms of 
respect for human rights, particularly in partially democratic and transitional countries (Shawki, 
2010). However, the methods, assumptions and analysis in Simmons’ book were also 
questioned by a self-proclaimed sceptic of human rights treaties, Posner (2012).  
Qualitative case studies use fieldwork research of activists around the world to show how they 
make use of human rights treaties. Merry (2006) presents case studies from India, Hong Kong, 
Hawaii, and Fiji to record some of the ways that local human rights activists “appropriate 
and enact” international human rights law. Similarly, Risse et al (1999; 2013 – 4136 citations) 
edited two volumes of research from a large selection of countries which detail the ways in which 
international human rights laws are “reinforced by transnational and domestic advocacy”, often 
leading to improvements in human rights practices. 
There is evidence that state parties to human rights treaties 
incorporate some of those rights into their national constitutions. 
Ginsburg et al. (2013, p.61) use a comprehensive database on the contents of the world's 
constitutions to show that “international rights documents, starting with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, have shaped the rights menu of national constitutions in powerful ways.” The 
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authors conclude that their research “confirms the complementary relationship between 
treaty ratification and domestic constitutional norms, and suggests that one important 
channel of treaty efficacy may be through domestic constitutions.”  
However, Posner (2014, p.77) points out that “many of those countries do not in fact respect the 
rights in their own constitutions.” 
Other research focuses on the internal UN processes of treaty 
enforcement, and finds that they have small, positive effects. 
Creamer and Simmons (2018, p.31-32) explain that: “All major UN human rights treaties have 
established bodies of experts to oversee treaty implementation. States parties are obligated to 
self-report to these bodies of putative experts. Critics uniformly point out that these bodies cannot 
enforce their recommendations. This is true. However, it does not necessarily follow that they are 
useless or without effect.”  
Focusing on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
Creamer and Simmons (2018) use quantitative analysis to compare report submission to 
CEDAW’s implementing bodies by 188 countries with women’s rights as measured by a women's 
political empowerment and fundamental civil rights index developed by the Varieties of 
Democracy project. They find that “periodic review under CEDAW has continuous, albeit small, 
positive effects on women's rights attributable to the cumulative reporting cycle” (p.52). 
The authors suggest that “treaty ratification initiates an iterative and ongoing ‘constructive 
dialogue’ between a government and the international human rights regime about progress - or 
lack thereof - on treaty implementation” (p.33), and that “the international community should 
not think of self-reporting as a hard enforcement mechanism, but rather as an opportunity 
for domestic stakeholders to mold their own futures in the shadow of international law” 
(p.34). 
4. What drives compliance? 
The reasons why states comply with international law is a major, 
and unresolved question in the literature. 
Known as the “compliance debate”, Scharf (2009, p.50) says that explaining why states comply 
with any type of international law “has been debated since ancient times and remains one of the 
most contested questions in international relations.”  
Compared with other types of international law, it is widely recognised that explaining state 
compliance with human rights treaties is particularly puzzling. Simmons (2009) notes that human 
rights regimes do not involve reciprocal compliance, as is the case with trade agreements. If 
one party does not respect a trade agreement, then it risks the other party retaliating by also 
withdrawing. This basic mechanism of reciprocal compliance is not at play in human rights 
agreements because one state’s failure to respect the rights of its citizens cannot be corrected by 
another state reciprocally violating the rights of its own citizens (Chilton, 2017).  
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Because explaining compliance with human rights treaties cannot rely on the fundamental 
mechanism of reciprocal compliance, the task is heavily influenced by theory. Simmons (2010, 
p.275) notes that “long-standing theoretical traditions continue to inform research.” In other 
words, a researcher’s worldview influences what types of research they undertake, which 
influences the type of empirical results found. There are a number of ways to describe the 
theoretical traditions that inform research in this area, Simmons (2009, p.275) notes at least nine. 
Carraro (2019) summarises them down to three in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: How different approaches understand drivers of compliance 
Name of Approach Drivers of compliance 
Enforcement  Actions that generate pressure on states to submit accurate and 
timely reports, or to follow-up recommendations. Could include 
pressure from states or the broader public. Can induce compliance 
through fear of material or reputational losses. 
Constructivist Processes that trigger learning. Reporting on human rights is viewed 
as a nonconfrontational mechanism where the focus is on stimulating 
learning, and socializing states to the “right” approach in dealing with 
human rights norms.  
Managerial Delivering practically feasible recommendations. Here, rule ambiguity 
is considered to be one of the most likely culprits of poor rule 
implementation. 
Source: Summarized from Carraro (2019, p.1082) under CC BY. 
These potential drivers are not mutually exclusive. Their value lies in offering a way to 
understand the different empirical results as detailed below.   
Many scholars highlight the importance of domestic civil society 
pressure to explain compliance. 
Neumayer (2005) conducted a large-scale quantitative analysis of countries to ask: Do 
international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? He includes variables to 
measure the strength of civil society and regime type. He states that “ratification is more 
beneficial the stronger a country's civil society, that is, the more its citizens participate in 
international NGOs” (p.950). He concludes that in most cases, for treaty ratification to work, 
there must be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and individuals and for civil society to 
persuade, convince, and perhaps pressure governments into translating the formal promise of 
better human rights protection into actual reality.  
Summarising her own research findings from her 2009 book, Simmons (2010, p.291): “argues 
that in stable autocracies, citizens have no means to mobilize without being crushed. In stable 
democracies, where rights are well protected, they have no real motive to mobilize. Treaties 
become useful tools in those cases in which locals have a reason to use them 
strategically to press their claims: in partial and transitioning democracies. Simmons' 
results show that certain rights, such as protections against torture, are correlated with treaty 
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ratification in this middle category of countries, but not in stable democracies or 
autocracies.” 
In a study of the reporting process under UN human rights treaties, Krommendijk (2015, p.194) 
concludes that: “While factors related to the defective design and limited legitimacy of the treaty 
body system inhibit the effectiveness of the recommendations, several domestic factors have 
at times positively affected the recommendations' effectiveness, particularly the 
mobilisation of domestic actors.”  
In a review of the literature, Keith (2010) characterises the research of both Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui (2005), and Powell and Staton (2009) as providing evidence that “as the number of 
INGOs to which citizens belong increases, the level of protection of human rights 
increases” (p.17/26 pdf). 
Other research finds that compliance is driven by domestic regime 
type, judicial effectiveness, and national security interests. 
Powell and Staton (2009) find that as the effectiveness of the domestic judiciary increases, the 
joint probability of ratifying the CAT in full and then violating the treaty decreases. According to 
Keith (2010) they only find mixed evidence that the joint probability of not ratifying and torturing 
increases with an effective judiciary in place. 
On regime type, Neumayer (2005, p.950) finds that “treaty ratification often becomes more 
beneficial to human rights the more democratic the country is.” 
Cardenas (2007) includes national security into her qualitative book length study on compliance. 
According to Simmons (2010), she finds that the more national security seems to be at stake, 
and the stronger “pro-violation constituencies” are within a country, the more likely that 
country is to violate human rights treaties and try disingenuously to appear to comply with their 
obligations. 
Preferential trade agreements are one external enforcement option 
that may help drive compliance. 
Hafner-Burton (2005) tests her hypothesis that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) help drive 
state compliance with human rights law through case studies and developing a statistical model 
to apply to 177 countries. She claims that “PTAs are more effective than softer human rights 
agreements in changing repressive behaviors. PTAs improve members’ human rights 
through coercion, by supplying the instruments and resources to change actors' incentives to 
promote reforms that would not otherwise be implemented” (p.593). However, she concludes that 
“International institutions have the greatest influence over state compliance with human 
rights principles when they offer substantial gains with some kind of coercive incentives” 
(p.624).  
There is evidence that ‘naming and shaming’ directly and indirectly 
drives compliance. 
Matanock (2020) summarises the literature on naming and shaming, noting that most research 
finds that naming and shaming generally supports human rights (DeMeritt 2012, Franklin 
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2008, Hendrix and Wong 2013, Krain 2012).  He highlights one exception: Hafner-Burton 
(2008).  
Hafner-Burton’s (2008) data on shaming came from Amnesty International reports, Economist 
and Newsweek reports, and United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolutions 
condemning human rights abuses. She tested for relationships with three indexes on repression, 
adding other variables on domestic context such as level of democracy, GDP, population and 
others. Testing her data for 145 countries from 1975 to 2000, she concludes that “governments 
put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations afterward, while 
reducing others” (p.689). 
Matanock (2020) also highlights research where the naming and shaming serves as a 
monitoring device that then induces some other type of punishment. For example, Barry et 
al. (2013) use similar large-number empirical quantitative techniques to Hafner-Burton, but with 
different data sources for shaming from a database that records the number of times in a year 
that Reuters reported shaming directed at a state by one of 432 human rights INGOs. The 
authors then test against foreign direct investment inflows to a country. Their results demonstrate 
that INGO shaming exerts a robust negative effect on foreign investment flows into the 
shamed state, indicating that multi-national corporations are indeed sensitive to the reputational 
costs that may be incurred through business dealings with states whose repressive practices 
have been actively publicised. 
Peterson et al. (2016) have a similar approach to studying the effect of naming and shaming on a 
country’s exports. They find that human rights abuse alone is insufficient to damage a state’s 
exports. However, as attention to abuse increases via human rights organisations 
shaming, abuse has an increasingly negative impact on exports. He adds that there is no 
effect of shaming when importers are similarly abusive. 
Using a data set of bilateral foreign aid to 118 developing countries between 1981 and 2004, 
Murdie and Peksen (2014) investigate the circumstances under which foreign aid donors apply 
aid sanctions to punish repressive states. They find that aid sanctions typically occur when 
repressive states do not have close political ties to donors, when violations have negative 
consequences for donors and when violations are widely publicised. In other words, naming and 
shaming increases the likelihood of aid sanctions on repressive states. 
Lebovic and Voeten (2009) show the connection between World Bank aid sanctions and 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolutions condemning a country's human 
rights record. 
The literature on the effects of naming and shaming on human rights is very large, not all aspects 
could be covered in this rapid review. 
Some research notes the importance of political pressure, NGO 
involvement, and elite socialisation within the UN’s internal 
reporting procedures.  
Carraro (2019) looks at the extent to which two United Nations human rights mechanisms—the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and the state reporting procedure of the treaty bodies—are 
perceived as capable of stimulating compliance with human rights. The author conducted 40 
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semi-structured interviews and an online survey with diplomats and experts who are directly 
involved in these two mechanisms.  
The study finds that, according to the interviewees, the UPR more effectively drives 
compliance because it allows the active involvement of NGOs in the process, and because 
recommendations for human rights improvements come from individual countries rather 
than experts: “Recommendations in the UPR are not endorsed by all UN states participating in 
the review, but are exclusively attributed to the country issuing them. Hence, they take the form 
of bilateral recommendations, which has strong political implications: accepted UPR 
recommendations become political commitments between countries” (Carraro, 2019, p.1090).  
However, taking a ‘constructivist approach’ whereby state elites are thought to change human 
rights practices through a process of learning, Creamer and Simmons (2019, p.31) find the 
“respectful posture toward states parties, using diplomatic and increasingly technical language” 
in treaty bodies to be more useful than harsh excoriation which is likely to lead to backlash. 
Based on the authors’ own observations, they identify four mechanisms within UN reporting 
procedures which drive compliance:  
• Elite socialisation 
• Learning and capacity building 
• Domestic mobilisation 
• Law development 
The authors nevertheless recognise the weaknesses of UN reporting, and that the processes 
they identify “exist synergistically with a multitude of other influences” (p.3). 
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